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CHAPTER 17
Atomism and semantics  
in the philosophy  
of Jerrold Katz1
KEITH BEGLEY
Jerrold J. Katz often explained his semantic theory by way of an analogy with physical 
atomism and an attendant analogy with chemistry. In this chapter, I track the origin and 
uses of these analogies by Katz, both in explaining and in defending his decompositional 
semantic theory, through the various phases of his work throughout his career.
THE ANALOGY WITH PHYSICAL ATOMISM
The first instance of the analogy with physical atomism is to be found in Katz and 
Fodor’s seminal paper, ‘The Structure of a Semantic Theory’ (Katz and Fodor 1963). 
There they refer to hypothesized ‘atomic concepts’ into which meanings may be 
decomposed, which are represented in the theory by way of semantic markers. 
The semantic markers and distinguishers are used as the means by which we can 
decompose the meaning of a lexical item (on one sense) into its atomic concepts, 
thus enabling us to exhibit the semantic structure in a dictionary entry and the 
semantic relations between dictionary entries. That is, the semantic relations 
among the various senses of a lexical item and among the various senses of 
different lexical items are represented by formal relations between markers and 
distinguishers. (Katz and Fodor 1964, 496)2
Later in the same article they point out that semantic markers are merely theoretical 
constructs that are used in an analogous way to that in which theoretical constructs 
have been used in other sciences.
a semantic marker is simply a theoretical construct which receives its interpretation 
in the semantic metatheory and is on a par with such scientific constructs as atom, 
gene, valence, and noun phrase. A marker such as (Human) or (Color) is, then, not 
an English word, but a construct represented by one. (Katz and Fodor 1964, 517)
A similar notion of ‘atomic concept’ is also employed in Katz and Postal’s 1964 work, 
An Integrated Theory of Linguistic Descriptions:
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The meaning of a lexical item is not an undifferentiated whole. Rather, it is 
analyzable into atomic conceptual elements related to each other in certain 
ways. Semantic markers and distinguishers are intended as the symbolic devices 
which represent the atomic concepts out of which the sense of a lexical item is 
synthesized. Readings represent such synthesizations of atomic concepts. (Katz 
and Postal 1964, 14)
In an endnote to the first sentence of this passage, they point out that, although 
componential analysis of the meanings of lexical items was already employed by an 
approach to the anthropological study of kinship terms in the 1950s, this approach 
had not been extended to very many other sets of lexical items nor to linguistic 
description more generally, and had not been integrated into the new generative 
linguistic descriptions that allow for the interpretation of an infinity of sentences 
(Katz and Postal 1964, 28, n. 7). Thus, it is clear that they saw the extension of 
this method to lexical items more generally, and its relation to the new Chomskyan 
grammar, as constituting part of the novelty of the theory.
THE FREGEAN ANALOGY WITH CHEMISTRY 
In an article from December 1964, ‘Semantic Theory and the Meaning of “Good”’, 
Katz extended the analogy between conceptual and physical atoms, to include an 
analogy with chemistry. This is an analogy between a reading, that is, a theoretical 
representation of the sense of an expression, composed of semantic markers, and a 
chemical formula for a molecule, in respect of the manner in which they represent 
the structures of their respective objects: 
[Semantic markers] are to be regarded as constructs of a linguistic theory in just 
the sense in which terms like ‘force’, ‘mass’, ‘molecule’, etc. are accepted as labels 
for scientific constructs in physical theory. There is here a strong analogy between 
the manner in which a reading for a sense of a word or expression represents its 
structure of concepts and their interrelations and the manner in which a chemical 
formula for a molecule of a substance represents its structure of atoms and the 
bonds between them. Both employ theoretical constructs of a scientific theory 
and a schema of representation to exhibit the elements and relations out of which 
a compound entity is formed. (Katz 1964, 744) 
Katz later makes similar statements in his book The Philosophy of Language (1966) 
and provides there in addition the following example of such a formula, a diagram 
for a molecule of ethyl alcohol:
H
|








(Katz 1966, 156; cf. Katz [1966] 1970, 187)
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The analogy with chemistry was quite important for Katz, and it continued to 
appear in various forms in publications throughout his career, the latest usage being 
in an article from 1992.3 Although Katz does not say so explicitly, I find it likely that 
the analogy was inspired by a similar analogy used by Gottlob Frege in ‘On Concept 
and Object’ (1892). There is, I think, good circumstantial evidence for this claim 
in that the analogy with chemistry certainly began to become important for Katz at 
just the time that he was beginning to read Frege closely. We should first note that 
later, in the preface to Semantic Theory (1972), Katz acknowledges a general debt 
to Frege, but also his and Fodor’s earlier ignorance of the details in Frege’s work:
the more our approach was worked out, the more it was found to embody 
versions of Frege’s principles. Fodor and I were originally unaware of the extent 
to which doctrines of ours were often replicas of Frege’s. In the present book, 
I have tried to indicate some of the debt that empirical semantics (in our sense) 
owes to him. (Katz 1972, xxiv) 
The first of these indications, following the statement just quoted, is in regard to 
Frege’s approach to the question ‘What is Meaning?’ (Katz 1972, 3n), a question 
that we will return to presently. The second indication is in regard to the principle of 
effability (Katz 1972, 19).4 A third is in regard to the notion of a primitive semantic 
marker, which is the theoretical representation of an atomic concept. Katz makes 
the point here that the inventory of such markers or the atomic concepts that they 
stand for cannot be set out in advance of the theory of which they are a part, but 
only as ‘required in the formation of dictionary entries’ (Katz 1972, 38). To this, 
Katz provides a footnote in which he quotes from Frege’s ‘On Concept and Object’ 
as follows:
my explanation is not meant as a proper definition. One cannot require that 
everything shall be defined, any more than one can require that a chemist shall 
decompose every substance. What is simple cannot be decomposed, and what is 
logically simple cannot have a proper definition. Now something logically simple 
is no more given us at the outset than most of the chemical elements are; it is 
reached only by means of scientific work. If something has been discovered that 
is simple, or at least must count as simple for the time being, we shall have to 
coin a term for it, since language will not originally contain an expression that 
exactly answers. On the introduction of a name for something logically simple, a 
definition is not possible; there is nothing for it but to lead the reader or hearer, 
by means of hints, to understand the words as is intended [Frege 1952, 42–3]. 
(Katz 1972, 38n)
Katz’ first published reference to the source of this quotation and, indeed, his first 
direct references to Frege5 are given in his book The Philosophy of Language (Katz 
1966, 47n), which was in press before October 1965 (Katz 1965, 600n). Moreover, it 
seems likely that he was asked by Arthur Danto, before the autumn of 1964, to begin 
writing an essay for inclusion in The Harper Guide to Philosophy, which he probably 
first submitted by the end of the summer of 1965, if not earlier.6 In that essay, Katz 
further develops the analogy with atomism, which we will discuss presently. However, 
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due to approximately a five-year delay, it is not until 1971 that this essay is published in 
the form of a book, The Underlying Reality of Language and its Philosophical Import. 
This short introductory book turns out to be quite programmatic, and it came just a 
few months before Katz published his main technical work, Semantic Theory (1972), 
to which the former work already contained many references added in footnotes.7 
The 1971 book also contains a short fragment of the same quotation from Frege’s 
‘On Concept and Object’ as that which is quoted in Semantic Theory, and in the 
same connexion regarding primitive semantic markers: ‘As Frege once observed, “. . . 
something logically simple is no more given us at the outset than most of the chemical 
elements are; it is reached only by means of scientific work.”’ (Katz 1971, 101). This 
indicates that Katz certainly had read ‘On Concept and Object’ at least five years 
before June 1971, and probably before October 1965 since he refers to the source in 
The Philosophy of Language, and perhaps as early as the summer of 1964, given that 
he had been recruited to write the essay in which he quotes Frege’s analogy. That is, 
early enough for it to have inspired the analogy with chemistry that appears in Katz’ 
article published in December of that year (Katz 1964). 
THE DEMOCRITEAN APPROACH 
Beginning with his short book in 1971, Katz adds a further element to the analogy 
through conceiving of his semantic theory as being part of a Democritean linguistic 
theory. This element of the analogy with atomistic theory serves to emphasize the 
appearance–reality distinction that is integral to the theory, in contrast to some 
other linguistic theories. Here, Katz takes the Democritean concept of matter to be 
a paradigm case:
The Democritean concept of matter originated as a purely hypothetical 
postulation. Initially, it could only have seemed the most extravagant of fancies. 
It proposed to populate the universe with unbelievably many new objects. 
Such objects were, moreover, supposed to be invisible and yet to provide the 
true understanding of visible phenomena. Finally, to add insult to injury, the 
concept flew in the face of the plain testimony of sense experience. But when it 
proved to yield better predictions and explanations of the observable behavior 
of physical objects and substances than the concept of continuity, it received 
scientific acceptance. The continuity hypothesis, which once must have seemed 
the last word in sober science, became relegated to the status of a depiction of 
appearance. (Katz 1971, 3)
Katz is careful to show how the Democritean approach contrasts with other 
philosophical approaches. For example, he says that it contrasts with the early 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy in respect of the latter’s ‘assumption that logical form is 
[inaccessible]’ (Katz 1971, 11). He quotes Wittgenstein’s famous clothing metaphor 
for this point from Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 4.002:
Language disguises thought. So much so, that from the outward form of the 
clothing it is impossible to infer the form of the thought beneath it, because the 
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outward form of the clothing is not designed to reveal the form of the body, but for 
entirely different purposes. (Wittgenstein 1922, 61–3, quoted in Katz 1971, 9–10)
Katz replies to this by tailoring the clothing metaphor to his own Democritean 
approach as follows:
To vary Wittgenstein’s metaphor somewhat: While it is true that language 
disguises thought, the disguise fits in such a way as to enable us to frame for 
ourselves a facsimile of the form of the body hidden beneath if we are willing 
to penetrate the disguise in the way physicists penetrated the disguise in which 
nature presents matter to us in sense experience.
Thus, a Democritean theory of language also contrasts with the later philosophy 
of Wittgenstein. Within the framework of a Democritean theory, we conceive the 
problem of understanding the logical features of language as a problem of theory 
construction. (Katz 1971, 12)
This variation would appear to be cut from similar cloth to that of Frege’s clothing 
metaphor in ‘The Thought’ (1918):
The thought, in itself immaterial, clothes itself in the material garment of a 
sentence and thereby becomes comprehensible to us. We say a sentence expresses 
a thought. (Frege [1918] 1968, 511)8
Katz takes somewhat of a middle position. That is, although the material garment 
is what enables us to frame a ‘facsimile’ of what it clothes, it is nonetheless a 
disguise that must be penetrated by constructing a Democritean theory of what 
lies beneath its covering. Katz does provide a reference to a translation of Frege’s 
article, but only at a much later point in the book, where he agrees with Frege’s 
non-psychological use of the word Gedanke (thought) (Katz 1971, 121n). He quotes 
the passage from the Tractatus in a number of other publications,9 but never quotes 
the concomitant passage from Frege’s article.10 So, it is uncertain whether Katz ever 
noticed a similarity with the passage from Frege. 
Katz takes the rationalist position, inspired by the work of Noam Chomsky, that 
since users of a language do indeed often manage to penetrate the orthographical 
and phonological disguises, we can frame a ‘facsimile’ of the underlying form 
through providing a theory of their competence to do so. This is also spelt out in 
terms of a contrast with what Katz calls non-Democritean theories. These theories, 
such as the pre-Chomskyan taxonomic theories of grammar, naively rely merely 
upon the manifest features of utterance-tokens when forming theories of sentence 
types (Katz 1971, 19). As Katz put it:
the non-Democritean assumption about the nature of language leads to grammars 
whose rules only permit descriptions of linguistic features observably manifest in 
utterances of sentences, while the Democritean assumption leads to grammars 
whose rules also permit descriptions of linguistic features that are not observably 
manifest. (Katz 1971, 31) 
Katz took Chomsky’s transformational model of grammar to be the embodiment 
of such a Democritean method and to be part of a tradition stretching back to 
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the universal grammar of the seventeenth-century Port-Royal grammarians (Katz 
1971, 46). Katz also contrasts the Democritean approach with the non-Democritean 
approach to the question ‘What is Meaning?’, which he calls ‘the big question of 
semantics’ (Katz 1971, 84). Non-Democritean theories, he says, tend to misconstrue 
the question as a request for a direct and straightforward answer (Katz 1971, 85–6; 
Katz 1972, 3). He lists some notable examples of such answers to the question: 
These include the [Platonic] answer that meanings are eternal archetypes; the 
Lockean answer that meanings are the mental ideas for which words stand as 
external signs; the answer that meanings are the things in the world to which words 
refer; the Wittgensteinian answer that meaning is use; the behaviorist answer that 
meanings are the stimuli that elicit verbal responses; the introspectionalist answer 
that meanings are mental images associated with verbal behavior; and so on. 
(Katz 1971, 85)
In contrast, the Democritean approach begins by reversing the order of investigation. 
That is, not by first attempting directly to state what meaning is in terms of something 
else that is better or more explicitly known to us antecedent to providing a theory 
of meaning, rather, by seeking to construct a theory of meaning before subsequently 
attempting to say more about what meaning must be in order to satisfy this theory 
as its object. Katz motivates this approach through a comparison with the history 
of other sciences:
Imagine what would have happened if ancient astronomers had insisted 
on knowing what sorts of things planets are before trying to describe their 
movements. Or, better yet, suppose mathematicians had insisted on a direct 
answer to the question ‘What are numbers?’ before trying to explain arithmetic 
properties and relations like ‘is the sum of ’, ‘is the square root of ’, and ‘is a prime 
number’. We would now be without a theory of arithmetic (i.e., number theory). 
(Katz 1971, 94)11
A corollary of this is that there is no room in this approach for philosophical 
scepticism about planets and numbers within astronomy and mathematics; these 
disciplines seek merely to provide adequate theories of what appears to us, that is, 
the phenomena. Analogously, Katz seeks to silence the sceptic of semantics by doing 
semantics; to refute them thus (cf. Katz 1972, 2). 
Katz is led by this diagnosis ‘to begin with the assumption that “What is meaning?” 
is a request for a semantic theory’ (Katz 1972, 3). This is the point from which he 
sets off in his main technical work Semantic Theory (1972). Here he follows again 
the example of the Democritean theory of matter, which he explains as follows:
Physicists were in no position to say what matter was until they identified a 
wide range of phenomena exhibited in the behavior of matter and ascertained 
many of the significant empirical facts in each case. These various phenomena 
(diffusion, expansion, interpenetration, conduction, etc.) demarcated the domain 
for a theory of matter by bringing together the properties that such a theory 
had to explain. It then became possible to compare different conceptions of the 
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nature of matter in terms of their explanatory adequacy within this circumscribed 
domain. We can say, therefore, that the Democritean theory was arrived at by 
the construal of the questions ‘What is diffusion (of matter)?’ ‘What is expansion 
(of matter)?’ ‘What is interpenetration (of matter)?’ and so on as components 
of the question ‘What is matter?’ This reflects the common practice in science 
of breaking down a large, general question into narrower, more specific ones. 
The answers to these questions then form integral parts of the answer to the 
general question because the phenomena about which they ask are within the 
appropriate explanatory domain. (Katz 1972, 4)
Analogously to this approach to matter, Katz breaks the big question of semantics 
‘What is meaning?’ into a non-exhaustive list of fifteen sub-questions that identify 
the most prominent sense properties and relations pertinent to a theory of meaning: 
synonymy and paraphrase, similarity and difference, antonymy, superordination, 
meaningfulness and anomaly, ambiguity, redundancy, analyticity and metalinguistic 
truth, contradiction and metalinguistic falsehood, syntheticity, inconsistency, 
entailment, presupposition, possible answerhood and self-answerhood (Katz 1972, 
4–6). For Katz, providing a semantic theory is to provide an integrated theory of 
these sense properties and relations, which the theory represents in terms of relations 
between semantic markers.
THE ANALOGICAL DEFENCES OF THE THEORY
These analogies with atomism and chemistry later become important for Katz’ 
defence of the theoretical approach. For example, in an article by Chomsky and Katz 
from 1974, the authors reply to what they take to be a Quinean misinterpretation of 
linguistics that was put forward by Stephen Stich. Stich complained that Katz seemed 
not to have sufficient evidence for his conclusions given that Stich himself was not 
able to derive as much from the same evidence using his own (non-Democritean) 
method. Chomsky and Katz reply to this by stating that there are always at least two 
ways to react to such a poverty of evidence:
we can point out that some people may well be interested in making hypothetical 
inferences about underlying causes on the basis of certain evidence, while others 
with different interests and outlook may choose to restrict their attention more 
narrowly to the evidence. We can certainly imagine that some early physicists 
might have been quite happy to accept diffusion and similar phenomena at face 
value, chiding their Democritean colleagues for ‘flamboyant portraits’ of atoms. 
(Chomsky and Katz 1974, 365)
The point here being that, unless one goes beyond the evidence and hypothesizes 
underlying linguistic form, one will be stuck at the naïve and non-Democritean level 
of manifest utterances. 
The analogy with chemistry later forms an important part of Katz’ defence 
against David Lewis’ (in)famous criticism of his semantic theory, which Lewis 
puts forward at the beginning of his paper ‘General Semantics’ (1970). There 
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Lewis refers pejoratively to the symbolism of the theory as ‘Semantic Markerese’, 
a characterization that has been parroted for decades following.12 Indeed, his 
argument relies upon this erroneous characterization of Katz’ theoretical symbolism 
as being a mere language:
Semantic markers are symbols: items in the vocabulary of an artificial language 
we may call Semantic Markerese. Semantic interpretation by means of them 
amounts merely to a translation algorithm from the object language to the 
auxiliary language Markerese. But we can know the Markerese translation of 
an English sentence without knowing the first thing about the meaning of the 
English sentence: namely, the conditions under which it would be true. Semantics 
with no treatment of truth conditions is not semantics. (Lewis 1970, 18)
Indeed, as Lewis goes on to say, if this were the case, one might as well have 
translated the English sentence into Latin for all the good it would do, because we 
would then be relying on ‘our tacit competence as speakers’ of this language, or our 
ability to do so-called ‘real semantics’ for the same by providing truth conditions 
(ibid., 18–19). 
Katz pointed out in his responses that Lewis completely overlooked or ignored the 
fact that the semantic theory is a theory and, as such, is distinct from a mere artificial 
language. Apart from this necessary emendation in the spirit of charity, Katz grants 
that, equipped with a semantic theory, the reading of an English sentence can be 
known without knowing the meaning of the English sentence. However, he points 
out that this is merely because it can be known, in a purely formal and procedural 
manner, via certain projection rules, that the theory maps a certain reading R onto a 
certain sentence S. However, this does not show what Lewis intended it to, because, 
as Katz explains:
a person who does not know semantic theory cannot know what claims R 
makes about the meaning of S. Since semantic theory provides the intended 
interpretation for the semantic portion of the grammar of a natural language, the 
reading R is merely a concatenation of meaningless symbols unless interpreted 
under an appropriate semantic theory. Similarly, someone may know that a 
chemical description of some covalent bond represents it as
H
. .
H : C : H
. .
H
without knowing what this symbolism asserts about the nature of the bond. (Katz 
1975, 108–9)13
So, it is important to stress, the readings produced by the semantic theory make claims 
when interpreted within the theory. That is, they are hypotheses about underlying 
structures, not mere translations. Lewis’ argument failed to show what he intended 
it to because, as Katz elucidates by way of the analogy with chemistry, ‘the relation 
between a sentence of a natural language and its reading(s) is no more translation 
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than the relation of [a chemical description] to a covalent bond is translation’ (Katz 
1975, 110).
For one matter, as Katz points out, in contrast to the theoretical ‘reading of ’ relation, 
the ‘translation of ’ relation is symmetrical. That is, ‘if S1 is a translation of S2, then S2 is 
a translation of S1 but the latter is asymmetrical, i.e., if R is a reading of S, then S is not 
a reading of R’ (Katz 1975, 110). So, Lewis would have needed to prove, at the very 
least, that the ‘reading of ’ relation is symmetrical. However, since a reading is part of 
a hypothesis generated by a theory of semantic competence, it contains or codifies 
information that is not directly contained in the sentence onto which it is mapped. So, 
it follows that such a proof is not possible, or at least not possible in most instances. 
Lewis’ further and somewhat glib remark that ‘Semantics with no treatment of 
truth conditions is not semantics’ is no objection to Katz at all, because it relies on 
an ambiguous antecedent usage of the word ‘semantics’ (cf. Katz 1972, 182), which 
Lewis himself acknowledged existed in the literature of the time. Katz’ theory is 
simply not aimed at explaining the same phenomena. Hence, Lewis merely begs 
the question (Katz 1975, 114).14 That is, he essentially says nothing more than that 
‘The theories of meaning with no treatment of truth conditions are not the truth-
conditional theories of meaning’, which does not even have the virtue of being false.15
SWIMMING IN THE ‘PLATONIST WHIRLPOOL’
In 1977, a major change takes place in Katz’ approach. Previously, he had adopted 
an anti-sceptical and non-reductionist method, as part of the Democritean approach, 
regarding the objects and posits of semantic theory. However, he had also expressed 
difficulties with, among others, some realist approaches such as the Platonist 
approach, calling it on various occasions ‘wholly uninformative’ (Katz and Fodor 
1962, 212),16 ‘empirically inadequate’ (1964, 762), ‘too vague and speculative’ 
(1971, 85) and even described the later Wittgenstein as attempting ‘to steer a safe 
course between the formalist rock and the Platonist whirlpool’ (1971, 11). 
Despite these earlier attitudes, in his article ‘The Real Status of Semantic 
Representations’ (1977), Katz broaches the topic of Platonism once again and 
reveals that he is preparing a work in which he will ‘try to develop a tenable version 
of the Platonist position’ (1977, 564n).17 This is what eventually becomes his 
book Language and Other Abstract Objects (1981) in which he develops a realist 
distinction between knowledge of language, in the sense of competence, and the 
language of which it is knowledge, which he considered to be an abstract object. A 
Chomskyan conceptualist theory of language is a theory of the former, a Platonist 
theory of language is a theory of the latter.
The explicit analogies with atomism and chemistry are notably absent during 
this transitional period, but soon return. First, in his article ‘Common sense in 
semantics’ (1982), the analogy with chemistry remains a means of explaining the 
decomposition of senses: 
we have to go beyond a notational scheme consisting, in effect, of numericals 
functioning as bare names of senses. We require a scheme that describes the 
structure of senses in the decompositional way that chemical diagrams describe 
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the molecular structure of compounds. Our first approximation is inadequate 
because it only provides names for senses taken as unanalyzed wholes.
In going beyond this first approximation, we are going beyond both Fregean 
and standard predicate calculi theories of the logical structure of natural 
languages. (Katz 1982, 198)
Here, Frege’s analogy with chemistry (if, as I suggested earlier, it was originally his) 
is turned against him. The ‘numericals’ mentioned here (later called ‘numerals’, 
cf. Katz 1990, 65) are intended to illustrate elements of a Fregean theory of sense. 
The point being that such unary designators standing for unanalysed whole senses 
are unable to describe the decompositional structure sufficient for subordination, 
antonymy and the other sense properties and relations. These designators are only 
capable of representing bare sameness and difference of sense, for example, {1} = 
{1} and {1} ≠ {2} and so on.18 While this was enough to enable Frege to provide 
solutions to his famous problems regarding co-referential names and opaque 
contexts, it is not sufficient to describe the other sense relations.19 
To see why this is, consider the following simple examples, which Katz uses in a 
later work. If one attempts to represent the synonymy between ‘sister’ and ‘female 
sibling’, their senses will be designated by different numerals and hence they will 
be marked as non-synonymous. If one attempts to represent the antonymy between 
‘open’ and ‘closed’ in this manner, one will not be able to mark the difference 
between this kind of sense relation and that between the merely non-synonymous 
‘open’ and ‘destroy’ (Katz 1990, 65). 
It is clear from this that Katz’ basic decompositional approach remained largely 
the same but that he was also beginning to distinguish his theory more carefully 
from its earlier Fregean influences. In his book Cogitations (1986), the analogy with 
the Democritean theory of matter is also put to work against the later Wittgenstein’s 
criticisms of the notion of analysis; an account of these criticisms is to be found 
in the previous chapter of the present volume (cf. Coliva 2020, 304ff.), including 
PI §47 to which Katz responded as follows: 
Everything that Wittgenstein says about the analysis of language can also be 
said about the analysis of physical substances. Physical analysis cannot employ 
absolute notions of simplicity and compositeness, either, and for the same logical 
reasons. But physicists from Democritus to Dalton employed a notion of the 
components of matter that was relativized to the scientific aim of uncovering the 
truth about its behavior. As a consequence, what physicists said about the nature 
of matter on the basis of scientific investigation enjoyed a derivative privileged 
status with respect to counter claims made on other bases. One couldn’t sensibly 
reply to the Democritean theory, ‘Matter? Well, it’s composed of atoms and 
molecules, relative to findings based on investigations aiming at the truth, but, of 
course, it isn’t relative to findings based on investigations with other aims.’ (Katz 
1986, 153)
That is, in the case of semantic theory, the analysis or, rather, the decomposition, 
is carried out just as far as is required to define the various sense properties and 
relations over the relevant atomic concepts, and thereby ‘to state true laws about 
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the properties of sentences’ (ibid.). Any less and the theory would lack explanatory 
power, any more and the theory would contain redundant elements. This is what 
‘defines the enquiry itself ’ (Katz 1986, 153–4).
In The Metaphysics of Meaning (1990), Katz seems to take a slightly broader view 
of the application of the term ‘Democritean’ (cf. Katz 1990, 53–7). Here he talks 
about Democritean approaches in both grammar and logic and reflects on their 
shortcomings when developing his Democritean approach to semantics. In earlier 
works, he had already applied the term to the Chomskyan rationalist approach to 
grammar. Here he says that the approaches of Frege and Russell could be seen as ‘a 
corresponding ‘Democritean’ tradition in modern logic which advocates posits of 
underlying logical structure to overcome the insufficiency of surface grammar to 
account for certain logical inferences’ (Katz 1990, 53). Here ‘Democritean’ means 
merely the recognition that there must be a distinction between surface and deep 
structure in the various areas in which it is applied. Katz’ approach to semantic 
theory draws on both traditions.
BETTER SEMANTICS THROUGH CHEMISTRY
The final mention of both the analogies with chemistry and atomism occurs briefly 
in Katz’ article ‘The New Intensionalism’ (1992):
Having no conception of analysis on which syntactically simple words in 
sentences like [‘The spot is blue’, ‘The spot is red’, ‘Bachelors are unmarried’, 
‘Red is a colour’, ‘Squares are rectangles’, ‘John is a bachelor’, ‘John is unmarried’] 
can have complex sense structure, Tractarian semantics had no access to the 
structure which actually determines the inferential powers of those sentences. 
Tractarian semantics is like chemistry prior to the period of the atomic theory; 
decompositional semantics is like chemistry afterward. (Katz 1992, 702)
The difficulty to which Katz is referring here is usually referred to as the colour 
incompatibility problem or the colour exclusion problem.20 That is, for example, 
the theoretical problem of marking the incompatibility relations between sentences 
such as ‘The spot is blue’ and ‘The spot is red’, given that their conjunction does not 
have the form of a logical contradiction, for example, ‘p and not-p’. Katz’ solution 
manages to link the senses of ‘red’ and ‘blue’ in such a way that avoids positing that 
the senses of the colour terms are explicitly contained in each other in isolation. 
Instead, it is in so far as such terms are involved in sentences that such relations hold. 
As Katz put it: ‘Compositionality makes the difference’ (Katz 1998, 572–3). The 
theory represents such structures through four interlinked formal devices, which 
Katz calls the antonymy operator, antonymous n-tuples, categorized variables and 
selection restrictions. 
I will now provide a brief exposition of the interlinked formal devices that Katz 
employs to implement his solution to the problem. The first is the antonymy operator 
‘A/. . .’, which is analogous to the negation operator in logical calculi; the difference 
is that negation is an external operator that toggles the truth value of its argument, 
that is, a proposition, from true to false or false to true, whereas the antonymy 
323ATOMISM AND SEMANTICS 
operator in Katz’ semantic theory is an internal operator that toggles from one 
semantic marker to others within the same antonymous n-tuple.21 An antonymous 
n-tuple is simply a set of markers that all contain the same superordinate marker; so, 
the antonymous n-tuple comprising the complex markers that contain the marker 
for the sense of ‘colour’, includes the markers for the senses of ‘red’, ‘blue’, ‘green’ 
and so on. The markers are automatically grouped in this way in virtue of the fact 
that each of them contains the superordinate marker ‘(colour)’. Katz states the 
general form of an antonymous n-tuple as: ‘(M(α1)), (M(α2)), . . . , (M(αn))’ (Katz 1972, 
52), where the semantic marker ‘M’ (in this context) represents the superordinate 
sense component and each α represents a different subordinate sense component, 
and he defines the notion of an antonymous n-tuple as follows:
Two semantic markers belong to the same antonymous n-tuple of semantic 
markers if and only if one has the form (M(αi)) and the other has the form (M(αj)), 
where i ≠ j and 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ n. (Katz 1972, 52)22
The next piece in the solution is the use that Katz makes of categorized variables and 
selection restrictions. A categorized variable awaits a semantic value given by another 
part of the reading of a sentence; they are categorized according to the functional 
notation of the syntactic theory being used. The variable is also given a selection 
restriction, for example, ‘<(colour)>’, which constrains the selection of the marker 
that will replace the variable. So, any semantic marker that replaces the categorized 
variable must include the superordinate marker ‘(colour)’. That is, the marker must 
be one that is taken from the antonymous n-tuple comprising the markers for the 
colour senses. Categorized variables are notated in the following fashion:
[  ] & K
X
< >
The square brackets include the functional syntactic notation that specifies a 
particular node of the underlying phrase marker for a sentence, for example, ‘subject 
of ’ is represented as ‘[NP, S]’, the function from a noun phrase to a sentence. It is the 
semantic reading (or a component thereof)23 of this node of the underlying phrase 
marker, represented as structured semantic markers, which will be substituted for 
the variable in a derived reading for the sentence (or higher-level constituent) as 
a whole. The angled brackets include the semantic selection restriction for the 
variable, for example, ‘<(colour)>’ (cf. Katz 1972, 104ff.).
Although the sense of ‘red’ does not contain the sense of any other specific colour 
term, it nonetheless excludes the sense of any antonymous colour term. The reading 
for ‘red’ is given in the form of the complex semantic marker ‘(((red), (A/(X)))
(colour))’,24 where ‘X’ is a categorized variable with ‘<(colour)>’ as its selection 
restriction, and the function ‘[F]’ as its syntactic function. The ‘[F]’ function picks 
out the semantic markers of the colour term in the predicate of a verb phrase, for 
example, the reading for ‘blue’. For instance, only the reading for some other colour 
term, for example, ‘blue’, could replace ‘X’ when ‘red’ is involved in a sentence 
ATOMISM IN PHILOSOPHY324
such as ‘Red is not blue’. The rules of Katz’ semantic theory would then mark this 
sentence as being analytic, and a sentence like ‘The spot is red and blue’ as being 
contradictory on a sense.25 Thus, the theory provides a theoretical explanation of 
such properties.
Katz’ Democritean semantic theory allows for the decompositional representation 
of what were considered by the early Wittgenstein to be independent, non-complex 
simples, as instead having a minimal internal complexity consummate with the 
relations into which the senses of such terms enter. As I have shown in this chapter, 
this approach to semantic theory was both explained and defended by Katz, 
throughout its various phases of development over more than thirty years, often by 
way of analogies with physical atomism and chemistry.
NOTES
1. A penultimate draft of this chapter was read at the work-in-progress árd-seimineár 
at the Trinity Plato Centre, Trinity College Dublin, in October 2019. I am especially 
grateful for the helpful discussion and for comments that I received from Vasilis 
Politis, Peter Larsen, Margaret Hampson and Simone Nota.
2. I quote instead from Katz and Fodor’s revised version of their paper included 
in their edited volume, The Structure of Language, published in 1964. Although 
they note that the article has been reprinted from the 1963 original, they made 
quite a number of changes and corrections throughout but make no note of this. 
Importantly, here the infelicitous phrase ‘the meaning of one ense [sic] of a lexical 
item’ (1963, 185–6) is replaced with ‘the meaning of a lexical item (on one sense)’ 
(1964, 496), because, of course, senses themselves do not have meanings, rather, 
they are meanings.
3. The analogy with chemistry has been noticed by Arnold M. Zwicky, who quotes 
from Katz (1966, 156) and pursues a related thesis (Zwicky 1973, 476). It was also 
noticed by Keith Allan ([1986] 2014, 317), who mentions Katz’ article (1964, 744), 
but grossly misinterprets the analogy there: ‘His semantic markerese is like chemical 
formulae in that it translates into English’ (Allan [1986] 2014, 317).
4. D. Terence Langendoen has recently claimed that it was instead Edward Sapir’s 
principle of formal completeness that was ‘reinterpreted’ by Katz as the principle of 
effability (Langendoen 2018, 261). However, this is not what Katz himself says in 
print. See my review of the edited volume that contains Langendoen’s article (Begley 
2019). It appears that Langendoen (2010, 141n) overinterpreted a claim made by 
Von Fintel and Matthewson (2008, 142–3), whom he subsequently neglected to cite 
in 2018. Their claim is in fact much weaker: ‘The effability idea has been around 
since at least Sapir [1924]’ (2008, 143, emphasis added). Nevertheless, they also 
overlook an attribution by Katz of the principle to Frege in 1923 (Katz 1976, 36).
5. ‘Fregeans’ are mentioned once before this, but merely as one group in a list of the 
proponents of various positions (Katz and Fodor 1962, 197). Frege’s work is, of 
course, mentioned by other authors in Fodor and Katz (1964).
6. In the preface of the book that resulted from this project, The Underlying Reality 
of Language and its Philosophical Import, dated June 1971, Katz reports that he 
originally wrote the book as an essay ‘about five years’ previous for inclusion in The 
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Harper Guide to Philosophy (Katz 1971, vii), edited by Arthur Danto. This was one 
of a number of guidebooks conceived by Fred Wieck, an editor at Harper. Robert 
Paul Wolff, the author of another of the essays, reports that he was the last to be 
recruited by Danto for the project, when he arrived at the Columbia philosophy 
department in the autumn of 1964, after Danto had been turned down by Isaiah 
Berlin. Danto requested that Wolff submit his essay for the end of the summer of 
1965, which he did (Wolff 1998, x–xi; Wolff 2010; Wolff 2019). So, it is likely that 
Katz submitted his essay at the same time or before, given that he was recruited 
before Wolff.
Although Katz noted the guide as being ‘in press’ in 1968 (Katz 1968a, 493), 
delays ensued. Another section author, Bernard Williams, later reported that he and 
some of the other authors even took to calling the guide ‘Harper’s Bazaar’ (Williams 
1993, xi). In 1970, it was suggested by Wolff that each essay instead appear as 
a short book. He lists the titles of the other books that came out of the project, 
apart from his own In Defense of Anarchism and Katz’ book, as: ‘What Philosophy 
Is, by Arthur Danto; Observation and Explanation, by Norwood Hanson; [. . .] 
Problems of Mind, by Norman Malcolm; What is Knowledge, by David Pears; The 
Philosophy of Logic, by Hilary Putnam; Morality: An Introduction to Ethics, by 
Bernard Williams; and Art and Its Objects; by Richard Wollheim’ (Wolff 1998, 
xii). Some of these were republished in the UK by Allen & Unwin, with Katz’ book 
retaining its title as a subtitle and taking the new title Linguistic Philosophy.
7. In a letter to Fritz Staal at the end of August 1968, Katz reported that he had 
worked on his book over the summer, completing chapters 1–4, and had written 
but not edited a further five (!) chapters, which he planned to finish over the next 
semester and then send a resulting ‘800-page opus’ to Staal (Katz 1968b). Semantic 
Theory (1972) has eight chapters.
8. Translated elsewhere as: ‘The thought, in itself imperceptible by the senses, gets 
clothed in the perceptible garb of a sentence, and thereby we are enabled to grasp it. 
We say a sentence expresses a thought’ (Frege 1997, 328).
9. For example, Katz (1981, 163; 1990, 67); and partially in (1992, 693).
10. It is uncertain what connection, if any, there is between the two passages. One 
might be tempted to think that because the Tractatus was published after Frege’s 
article, it includes a response to the latter. However, Wittgenstein’s above quoted 
remarks from 4.002 appear with minor differences in 4.0014 and 4.00141 of an 
earlier manuscript, MS104 on page 36 (Wittgenstein 2015). Also included there is 
another relevant remark that is not preserved in the Tractatus: ‘Thus the outward 
aspect of ordinary language makes every kind of illusion and confusion possible’ 
(Wittgenstein 1971, 4.0015). On some views, this material may originally date to 
Wittgenstein’s time in Norway, between October 1913 and June 1914 (Kang 2005, 
6), and, on others, at least between October 1915 and March 1916 when added to 
MS104 (McGuinness 2002, 266), although there is still much disagreement. I do 
not intend to adjudicate on the matter here.
Frege and Wittgenstein met and engaged in correspondence but, from what 
remains of this, the clothing metaphor is not apparent. However, the metaphor was 
indeed used much earlier by Frege and so may have been mentioned in conversation 
with Wittgenstein during the intervening period. The following rather clear and 
pertinent example comes from a posthumously published paper, entitled ‘Logic’, 
dated to 1897, in which Frege notes a ‘difficulty’: 
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grammar, which has a significance for language analogous to that which logic 
has for judgement, is a mixture of the logical and the psychological. If this were 
not so, all languages would necessarily have the same grammar. It is true that 
we can express the same thought in different languages; but the psychological 
trappings, the clothing of the thought, will often be different. (Frege [1897] 
1979, 142; cf. 135, 185; also printed in Frege 1997, 243; cf. 361)
Frege had earlier used a similar clothing metaphor regarding concepts, in The 
Foundations of Arithmetic (Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik, 1884): ‘Often it is only 
through enormous intellectual work, which can last for hundreds of years, that 
knowledge of a concept in its purity is achieved, by peeling off the alien clothing 
that conceals it from the mind’s eye’ (Frege 1997, 88). Wittgenstein is known to 
have had a copy of the Grundlagen at Cambridge (now preserved in the Russell 
Archives), which he abandoned there when he returned to Norway in October 1913 
(Kienzler 2011, 81–2). Another possible influence upon Wittgenstein may have been 
Heinrich Hertz. This is also noted by Hacker (1972, 12). In the closing remark of 
Hertz’ introduction to a collection of papers he says: 
scientific accuracy requires of us that we should in no wise confuse the simple 
and homely figure, as it is presented to us by nature, with the gay garment 
which we use to clothe it. Of our own free will we can make no change 
whatever in the form of the one, but the cut and colour of the other we can 
choose as we please. (Hertz [1892] 1893, 28)
11. Katz here repurposes without citation Quine’s example of ancient astronomy (1953, 
47), which he later quotes for the same purpose (Katz 1972, 9).
12. For example, when Keith Allan says: ‘His semantic markerese is like chemical 
formulae in that it translates into English’ (Allan [1986] 2014, 317), cf. note 3 above.
13. The diagram’s numbering has been removed.
14. Further, as Gilbert Harman makes clear in ‘Meaning and Semantics’ (1974), Lewis’ 
argument can also be applied to truth-conditional theories of meaning:
Similarly, there is a sense in which we can know the truth conditions of an 
English sentence without knowing the first thing about the meaning of the 
English sentence. To borrow David Wiggins’s example, we might know that 
the sentence “All mimsy were the borogroves” is true if and only if all mimsy 
were the borogroves. However, in knowing this we would not know the first 
thing about the meaning of the sentence, “All mimsy were the borogroves.” 
(Harman 1974, 6)
Wiggins’ example is to be found in a footnote in his ‘On Sentence-Sense, Word-
Sense, and Differences of Word-Sense’ (1971), which comments on the Vienna 
Circle’s verifiability criterion of meaning: 
I surely cannot say or explain what All mimsy were the borogroves means by 
saying that this sentence will be true if and only if everything satisfies the open 
sentence if X is a borogrove then X is mimsy. And it is certainly a part of what 
would still be lacking in this explanation that it gives no idea at all of what 
investigations with what outcome would count for or against the assertion. 
(Wiggins 1971, 19n) 
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It is somewhat ironic that both Wiggins and, following him, Harman misquoted 
from the poem ‘Jabberwocky’ by Lewis Carroll. The word is instead ‘borogoves’. 
Although the borogroves sounds like a miserable place to be, perhaps near the wabe 
and where one might find a mimsy borogove, it is uncertain whether the borogroves 
could really be mimsy at all. Perhaps more ironically, the word first appears in 
Carroll’s earlier ‘Stanza of Anglo-Saxon Poetry’ (1855), where he provided a literal 
English translation for the ‘nonsense’ sentence containing it: ‘all unhappy were the 
parrots’ (Carroll [1855] 1932, 141).
15. Admittedly, Lewis seems to rely upon his impression of the early Katz and Postal 
version of the theory from 1964, and it is not until the Democritean approach 
is spelt out by Katz in 1971 that its differences with other, non-Democritean 
approaches generally would have become clear. However, this kind of 
misunderstanding of Katz has continued for quite some time.
16. Here Platonism is referred to under the banner of ‘theories of meaning based upon 
notions of “real essence”’ and is called uninformative, together with theories based 
upon notions of ‘mental idea’, due to a lack of a criterion for two expressions having 
the same semantic property, in particular synonymy (Katz and Fodor 1962, 212).
17. Keith Allan claimed, rather proleptically, that the change had instead already 
happened in 1972:
K’s Platonism can be traced back to his Semantic theory (1972). Earlier (1967, 
129), he had described the conceptual content of a semantic marker as ‘what is 
common to our individual ideas’. However, five years later he was saying that 
the concepts represented by semantic markers are not something that people 
have in mind on any one or any number of occasions: ‘Concepts . . . are 
abstract entities. They do not belong to the conscious experience of anyone’ 
(1972, 38). What K seems to intend here is that the content of a semantic 
marker is something like a Platonic Form (eîdos) or Idea (idéa). (Allan 1983, 
678; cf. [1986] 2014, 89–90) 
Allan overlooked the fact that the quote continues immediately: ‘though they may 
be thought about’ (Katz 1972, 38). The passage was probably written not five 
years but one year later (cf. note 7). Further, Allan failed to notice that Katz’ early 
Democritean approach in 1972 ruled out condensed answers such as ‘Platonic 
archetypes’ (1972, 3, 7), and that, on the very next page, Katz states that ‘the 
question of what the ontological status of concepts and propositions is [. . .] will be 
left here without a final answer’ (1972, 39).
18. The symbols for identity and non-identity are used here redundantly.
19. This distinction, between what he called expressional and non-expressional 
relations, first appears in Katz and Katz 1977, but is not spelt out in detail there.
20. Apart from Katz’ own accounts, especially Katz (1998), I recommend Jacquette 
1990 as an accessible account of the early Wittgenstein’s problem.
21. I exclude here several further clauses to the definition of this operator, which are 
superfluous for our present purposes (cf. Katz 1972, 160–8).
22. Katz later extends this device to infinite such collections of markers which he calls 
‘antonymy sets’ (Katz 1972, 312).
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23. ‘K’ is an optional function that specifies that the variable should be filled by a more 
precisely determined semantic marker (Katz 1972, 104ff., 258ff.).
24. This formalism can be given an equivalent representation as a tree structure, with 
‘(colour)’ dominating ‘(red)’ and ‘A/(X)’ (cf. Katz 1998, 567).
25. Full details can be found in Katz (1998 and 2004).
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